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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE
PROCEEDINGS - REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD
In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent decision of In
re Winship,1 held that the "essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment" require that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" be the stand-
ard administered at the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding
where the juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult. The case grew out of a finding by
a New York Family Court2 that appellant, then a 12-year-old boy,
was a juvenile delinquent.3 The judge specifically stated that his
finding was based on a preponderance of the evidence offered,
which was the standard required by the applicable New York stat-
ute." As a result of that finding, the youth was committed to a train-
ing school for a period of up to 6 years. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed,5 basing its decision on the express statutory lan-
guage and the need for a special system to deal with juvenile of-
fenders, which would remain apart from the methods and ineradi-
cable consequences of the criminal system. The Supreme Court
reversed.
1397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2 In 1962 New York created a system of family courts. Although the jurisdiction
of these courts has been changed twice through amendments in 1964 and 1970, they
still retain exclusive original jurisdiction over, among other things, "proceedings con-
cerning juvenile delinquency and whether a person is in need of supervision.
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
3 A juvenile delinquent is defined as "a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime."
N.Y. FAMULY CT. Acr § 712(a) (McKinney 1963).
The "crime" element distinguishes juvenile delinquents from other minors who
come within the jurisdiction of the Family Court For example, a "person in need of
supervision" is defined as "a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than
eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accord with the provisions of part
one of article sixty-five of the education law or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or
habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful author-
ity." N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970). The Winship Court
specifically excluded the latter from its decision because they are not accused of a crime.
397 U.S. at 359 n.1.
4The relevant section provides: "Any determination at the conclusion of a fact-
finding hearing that a respondent did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance
of the evidence." N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 744(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
5 W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
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The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, reaffirmed
the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard. The
Court "explicitly [held] that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged." Mr. Justice Brennan found support for the consti-
tutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard by an examination
of its history and its importance in the operation of the criminal
law. He emphasized the nearly unanimous adherence to the higher
standard of proof in common law jurisdictions and the many opin-
ions of the Court which have assumed that the reasonable doubt
standard is constitutionally required.' One of the moral founda-
tions on which the criminal law is based is that the greatest possible
accuracy in factual determinations must be maintained to prevent
conviction of the innocent. Thus, the standard serves the important
role of reducing the risk of criminal conviction based on factual
error.
These same considerations apply to a juvenile involved in an
adjudicatory proceeding which could result in a deprivation of his
freedom. As the Court established in In re Gault,8 the standards
that are essential to procedural fairness, as embodied in the due proc-
ess clause, apply to juveniles as well as to adults. Mr. Justice Bren-
nan rejected the State court's reliance on the statutory difference be-
tween a conviction and a finding of delinquency as being a resort to
the illusory "civil label of convenience" which was rejected in the
Gault opinion.
Although in full agreement with the holding of the majority,
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion. He emphasized that
not all the procedural requirements imposed by due process in a
criminal case should be carried over to the juvenile process. Rather,
a balance must be sought between constitutionally imposed procedural
fairness and "the essential elements of the state's purpose" in creat-
6 397 U.S. at 364.
7 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
8 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault the Court held that the due process dause demands
that juveniles be accorded procedurally fair treatment during an adjudication where a
criminal act is charged. The elements of procedural fairness include adequate notice
of the specific charges or factual allegations, notice of the right to counsel and the avail-
ability of court appointed counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the right to an appellate re-
view with a transcript of the proceedings.
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ing juvenile courts? Mr. Justice Harlan would create a constitu-
tional standard by applying "settled usages and modes of proceed-
ings" and "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" to the
character and requirements of each fact situation.'
Mr. Justice Black dissented in an opinion which exceeded the
problems presented by this particular case. He felt that the Court
went beyond application of the procedural requirements found ex-
plicitly in the Bill of Rights and created a standard not required by
the Constitution. Although he agreed that strong arguments can be
made for the reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases, he did not
feel it was the role of the Court to say that another standard, not
prohibited by the Constitution, is forbidden. Mr. Justice Black would
limit the Court to the words of the written Constitution, strongly
opposing those interpretations of the due process clause that use
fundamental procedural fairness as a test of constitutionality."
Mr. Chief Justice Burger also dissented. He thought the Court
erred in assuming that juvenile proceedings are criminal prosecu-
tions subject to constitutional limitations. He asserted that the Court
is forcing the states to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts.
This is in conflict with the intentions of the state legislatures to
create benevolent, less formal institutions to deal with the problems
of juvenile offenders.'" Mr. Chief Justice Burger could find no con-
stitutional due process requirement to override this legislative judg-
ment of the states.
The majority argued, however, that the beneficial aspects of the
juvenile system would not be harmed by application of the reason-
able doubt standard. Mr. Justice Brennan emphasized the limited
area in which the higher standard was required. The decision only
affects the quantum of proof at the adjudicatory stage of a proceed-
ing where a juvenile is charged with a criminal act. The preliminary
and dispositional stages of the process are unchanged. A change in
9 397 U.S. at 375.
10 fMr. Justice Harlan originally developed this line of reasoning in his opinion in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 68 (1967). He stated that only three procedural requirements
should be applicable to state juvenile courts: (1) timely notice of the nature and terms
of the proceeding should be given to the parents and children; (2) full and timely no-
tice should be given to both the parents and children that counsel may appear on their
behalf and that when an offense may result in confinement, counsel may be appointed
for an indigent;, and (3) a written record should be kept for review on appeal. He felt
that the privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to confrontation and cross-
examination were unnecessary requirements. Id. at 72.
11 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
12 See generally Young, A Synopsis of Ohio Juvenile Covrt Law, 31 U. GN. L. REV.
131, 136 (1962).
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the standard of proof on which the judge must base his decision
does not, in itself, appear to be the kind of change that could pre-
cipitate the destruction of the juvenile system that Mr. Chief Justice
Burger predicts.
The Winship decision has settled the controversy, which had oc-
cupied state courts and legislatures since Gault, over the correct
standard of proof in juvenile cases."3 The three approaches of the
state courts prior to Winship illustrate the disagreement among the
states. Some states had concluded that the reasoning and language
of the Gault opinion called for an application of the standard of
proof used in criminal trials.'4 Others, like the New York Court
of Appeals in Winship, concluded that, despite Gault, the proceed-
ings remained civil in nature and the civil preponderance of the evi-
dence standard was sufficient.' 5  A third response, exhibited by
the Supreme Court of Ohio in In re Agler,"6 was that the Gault
decision called for more than the civil standard, but did not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Agler court found the clear
and convincing evidence standard appropriate in a proceeding which
has both criminal and civil aspects.
Although the day-to-day operations of the juvenile courts are not
likely to be changed by adoption of the reasonable doubt standard,
Winship does take those courts one step further from the juvenile
system which the reformers intended to create.' Each constitutional
standard imposed on a juvenile court makes it less a social agency
and more a court of law. The role of the juvenile judge is now com-
plicated by the possibility of reversals because an appellate court
may not believe, as a matter of law, that the evidence was sufficient
to meet the higher standard.'8
13 See generally Cohen, The Standard of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings: Gault
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 567 (1970).
14 See, e.g., In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968). See also United
States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968) (prose-
cution of a 17-year-old youth for interstate transportation of a stolen car under the
Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964)).
15 See, e.g., In re M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); W. v.
Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969); State v.
Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969).
16 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969). Agler led to the codification of the
clear and convincing standard. OrIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1970)
(effective Nov. 19, 1969). See also C. McCoRMIcK, EvIDENcE §§ 319-21 (1954), for
a discussion of the applications of the standards of proof.
17 See Young, supra note 12, at 136.
1 8 See Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527, 552 (1968).
In another part of his article, however, Professor Paulsen concluded that, regardless of
